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FIRST DAY

SECTION QIB
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Roanoke, Virginia, June 27-28, 1966

QUESTIONS
1. Axelrod sued Bluestone in the City of Lynchburg on a
cause of action to recover for personal injuries because of a fall
occurring on May 1, 1965, allegedly due to Bluestone's negligent
maintenance of his business establishment in Lynchburg. At the
trial on April 15, 1966, there was a c6nflict of the evidence as to
how the accident happened and whether Axelrod had actually been on
the premises on the day in question. In the cross-examination of
Axelrod, Bluestone 1 s lawyer asked Axelrod if it wasn't true that
Axelrod had been:
(a) Convicted of petit larceny in Virginia on
June 10, 1955;
(b) Indicted for malicious wounding and maiming
in Virginia on February 5, 1960, and at his trial
on March 11, 1960, convicted of simple assault;
(c) Convicted of drunkenness and illegal possession
of intoxicants in Virginia on April 6, 1965;
(d) Convicted of grand larceny in Virginia on
February 2, 1966; and
( e)

Convicted of rape in North c. rolina on May
0

10, 1950.

Axelrod's lawyer objected separately to each question,
stating grounds therefor.
How should the Court rule on each objection?
2. Carr was injured on th~premises of Donnelly
Apartment Corporation in Virginia Beach, Virginia, where he was
struck by a handcart being pushed by one Edwards. Carr instituted
an action in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach
against Donnelly Apartment Corporation alleging that the defendant
was negligent in using or permitting the use of a defective cart,
and that Edwards, as an employee and servant of Donnelly Apartment
Corporation, was negligent in pushing the cart into the plaintiff.
Donnelly Apartment Corporation by proper responsive pleadings
denied all allegations of negligence, and expressly denied that
Edwards was its servant acting within the scope of his employment
at the time of the alleged injury.

At the trial, plaintiff put on his first witness,
Fosdick, a private investigator, and established that Edwards'
present whereabouts was unknown and that Fosdick had investigated
the accident for Carr. Upon being asked the results of the
investigation, Fosdick testified:
"On the evening of the same day of the accident,
I located Edwa.rds at his home, and he told me
that at the time of the accident: (a) he was going
home after having quit work for the day for
Donnelly, having punched out on the time clock a
half hour earlier, but the manager of the apartment
house asked him to take the cart outside, and (b) that
he, Edwards, knew that the cart had bad wheels and
was hard to control and had reported this to the
manager some time previously, but it had not been
fixed and on this occasion, he was in a hurry and
did.not even see Carr before he struck him."
Defense counsel objected to this testimony on the
grounds: (a) that Edwards' statement as to working for the
defendant at the time of the accident was inadmissible, and (b)
that Edwards' statement as to the defective cart and his negligent
operation thereof, in any event, was inadmissible against and not
binding on the corporate defendant.
How should the Court rule on each objection?

3. By-Products Corporation filed a bill in equity in the
Circuit Court of Goochland County, Virginia, against William
Samuels, trading as County Shopping Center. The purpose of the suit
was to enforce the lien of a deed of trust on the land and buildings
owned by Samuels and used by him in the operation of his business.
After the defendant had answered, the Court entered a decree of
reference to a Master Commissioner of the Court with directions to
report to the Court all of the assets of the defendant, the liens
thereon and the order of their priority. After the entry of the
decree of reference, Ball Point Company commenced a suit in the
same court to enforce its judgment lien against the same property
of Samuels. Novelty Company and Wholesale Company held judgment
liens on the same property of Samuels and each proved the amount
of their debts and their judgment liens before the Master
Commissioner.
1. Samuels appeared in the suit filed by Ball
Point Company and moved the Courtto dismiss the
suit or to suspend the prosecution thereof.
How should the Court rule on this motion?
2. By-Products Corporation appeared in the suit that
it commenced and advised the Court that Samuels had

-3paid it one-half of the amount due on its lien
and that it had accepted a note for the balance,
secured by a deed of trust on other property of
Samuels and it moved that the Court dismiss its
suit.
How should the Court rule on this motion?
(3) Seashore Amusement Company held a judgment
lien against Samuels which became barred by the Statute
of Limitations after the decree of reference was
entered in the suit commenced by By-Products
Corporation. Nevertheless, Seashore Amusement
Company appeared before the Master Commissioner
in that suit and submitted proof of its claim.
Samuels filed a plea of the Statute of Limitations
to this claim.

How should the Court rule on this plea?

4. On March 31, 1966, Machen instituted an action at
law in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk against New Town
Stores, Inc., and John Goodman, doing business as Old Time
Restaurant, seeking a recovery of $25,000. The motion for judgment
alleged that on January 2, 1965, as Machen was leaving the grocery
store, which was owned and operated by New Town Stores, Inc., he
was caused to fall and was injured because of a negligently maintained doorway; that he proceeded to his automobile, which was
parked in front of the adjoining establishment, Old Time Restaurant,
but because of feeling faint from his injuries, he sat down in
front of the restaurant; that Goodman negligently procured and
administered to him a substance which turned out to be concentrated
household ammonia, from the ingestion of which he sustained
permanent internal injuries. New Town Stores, Inc., was served with
process on April 1, 1966, but Goodman was not served until May 2,
1966.

What pleading should have been filed by counsel for
each defendant and when?

5. Porter sued Newton in the County Court of the County
of Surry, seeking a recovery in the sum of $47 for property
damage to his automobile as the result of Newton's alleged negligence
in a certain automobile accident. Before this case was tried,
Newton, who was injured in the accident, sued Porter in the Circuit
Court of Surry County, seeking a recovery for personal injuries for
$25,000, alleging that Porter's negligence caused the accident.
Upon trial of the action in the County Court, judgment was rendered

--~·-

in favor of Porter in the sum of $47. Porter thereupon filed a
plea of res judicata and a motion to dismiss in the action of Newton
against Porter still pending in the Circuit Court. Newton filed a
motion to reject the plea on the ground that the judgment in the
county Court was contrary to the law and the evidence and was not
res judicata because:
(a) The County Court was a court not of record, and as
an inferior court, its judgment would not be binding on
the Circuit Court, which was a court of record.
(b) That the subject matter was not the same, one
cause being for property damage to Porter's automobile
and the other for personal injuries to Newton.
(c) That even though the County Court judgment was
clearly erroneous, it was not appealable to the Circuit
Court or any other court of record because it was for
only $47, which was below the $50 required jurisdictional
amount and, therefore, the judgment could not be
considered res judicata, for to do so would deprive
Newton of his legal rights without a complete judicial
hearing.
How should the Circuit Court rule on each contention?

6. Youngblood, a promising young attorney, has just lost
his first big case in which Battleax, the Circuit Judge, clearly
ignored the holding of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in the
"Holdover Case 11 decided less than four months previously on the
precise issue.
Youngblood moved to set aside the verdict. This motion
was overruled and Youngblood noted his exceptions. After filing a
notice of appeal and assignments of error, and after procuring a
certification of the transcript of the evidence and other incidents
of the trial, Youngblood prepared and presented a petition for
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals. The petition for appeal
consisted entirely of a brief narrative statement of the facts of
the case, and argument in the following language:

.

i.While this case, filed January 15, 1966, was
pending a similar defense in a case of similar
facts was considered and disposed of by this Court
in the case of Holdover v. Landlord, 212 Va. 3,
140 S.E. 2d 312.
11

The Holdover decision was announced after answers
were filed to the petition in the case at bar. We
respectfully submit that the Lower Court in entering

-5the judgment herein complained of wholly
ignored the law as was announced in the Holdover
Case. i.
Experience, counsel for appellee, moved the Court to
dismiss the petition for appeal.
How should the Court rule on the motion?

7. Bill Herman was properly indicted and tried for
breaking and entering an outhouse owned by George Jolly with intent
to commit larceny and for the larceny therefrom of 64 pieces of
cured hog meat. At the trial, the commonwealth's attorney had
introduced into evidence as an exhibit a piece of hog meat owned by
Jolly that had not been taken and a piece of hog meat found in the
accused Herman's house upon lawful search. The commonweal th' s
attorney attempted to show through Jolly whether he had any meat
left that was not stolen and how it compared with the two exhibits
which had beEn introduced. Defendant's counsel objected to the
admissibility of this evidence, and thereupon, the judge, the
commonwealth's attorney, and defense counsel retired to the judge's
chambers to consider the admissibility of this evidence. The
defendant and jury were left in the courtroom. After a protracted
argument, the judge concluded and stated to counsel that the
evidence was admissible and would be allowed over defendant's
objection. Upon return to the courtroom, the judge announced that
defendant's objection was overruled and the witness would be allowed
to testify.
Herman was convicted and thereupon moved the Court to
set aside the verdict on the ground that he, as an accused, had not
been present during the entire proceedings in that he was not
present during the argument in chambers as to the admissibility of
the above evidence.
What should be the ruling of the Court?

8. Rogers, a citizen of Virginia, was injured in
Portsmouth, Virginia, while working as a brakeman for A. T. & T.
Railway Company, a Virginia corporation engaged in interstate
commerce, and while switching its cars over tracks maintained by the
O. R. & E. Railway Company, a Virginia corporation, on the premises
of Marine Industrial Company, a Virginia corporation. Rogers
instituted an action at law in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia against all three of the corporations
and alleged that he was entitled to a recovery against the A. T. &
T. Railway Company under the Federal Employers' Liability Act because he was injured as the result of defective equipment furnished
by the A. T. & T. Railway Company and the negligence of his fellowemployees of the A. T. & T. Railway Company; and also alleging a

I

/

-6cause of action against the O. R. & E. Railway Company for its
negligence in the maintenance of the tracks involved and against
the Marine Industrial Company for its negligence in obstructing the
said tracks on its premises, all of which acts of the three
defendants combined to cause the accident and produce the injuries
complained of.

A. T. & T. Railway Company filed its answer admitting
jurisdiction but denying liability. ·The O. R. & E. Railway Company
and the Marine Industrial Company each filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction, said motions conceding that the Court did
have jurisdiction over the case of Rogers v. A. T. & T. Railway
Company by virtue of the provisions of the Federal Employers 1
Liability Act, but that the Court did not have jurisdiction over the
other parties regardless of plaintiff 1 s contention that the
defendants were jointly negligent and their combined acts were indivisible causes of the accident.
How should the Court rule on the motions of 0. R. & E.
Railway Company and Marine Industrial Company?

...

I
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-710. Smith, Jones and Brown, a Virginia law firm, has
prepared a profit sharing plan that qualifies under the pertinent
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Is it ethical for the firm to adopt the plan which
provides, on the basis of a predetermined percentage, benefits for
employees of the firm who are not lawyers?

FIRST DAY

SECTION TWO
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Roanoke, Virginia, June 27-28, 1966

QUESTIONS
1. By a written contract bearing date January 3, 1966,
and signed by both parties, William Burke agreed to sell to John
Hamilton ten acres of land, strategically located for development
purposes. This contract included, upon the insistence of Hamilton,
this provision:
11

If this land cannot be rezoned by March 1, 1966,
for use as a motel, this contract is null and void."
On February 27th, it became apparent to both parties
that rezoning could not be effected by March 1st, and each party
signed an addendum to the contract containing the following language:
11

It is agreed that the period of time for effecting
rezoning of the property is extended to May 1, 1966."

On April 29th,the property had not been rezoned and it
then became apparent that a rezoning as contemplated by the parties
could not be accomplished. On April 30th, Burke received a letter
from Hamilton stati~g:
If the property cannot be rezoned, I have nevertheless decided to purchase the property and I
herewith send you my certified check for the purchase
price and request that a deed be delivered. 11
11

Burke promptly returned the check to Hamilton and
advised that he would not convey the property to him. Hamilton
commenced a suit against Burke seeking specific performance of the
contract. Burke filed an answer by which he raised the following
defenses:
1. The extension of time f~r the performance
of the contract was invalid in that it was not
supported by a consideration; and
2. The contract lacked mutuality of remedy and could
nqt be enforced specifically.
defenses?

How should the Court rule with respect to these

2.

Beau Stirrup, an emancipated infant of twenty years,

-2-

had been earning his living at various race tracks as an exercise
boy. He was anxious
to own his own race horse and, believing that
two-year old 11 Fast Pace 11 would prove to be a great money winner,
he offered to buy the horse from his owner, Jock Bookmaker, for
the sum of $3,000. Before Bookmaker would sell the horse he
inquired of Stirrup his true age. Stirrup assured him that he was
twenty-two years of age, stating that he had been making his living
by exercising horses since he became twenty-one. Believing that
Stirrup had correctly represented his age, Bookmaker sold and
delivered the horse to Stirrup and received in payment $3,000 in
cash. Ten days after purchasing the horse Stirrup concluded that
he had made a bad purchase and insisted that Bool\.mak.er take the
horse back and pay him the $3,000. Bookmaker refused the demand
made by Stirrup. Stirrup consults you and inquires whether he may
compel Bookmaker to take the horse back and pay him the amount of
the purchase price.
What would you advise?

3. Hampton took his automobile to Auto Repair Shop, Inc.,
for repairs. A mechanic employed by that company drove the car
out onto the highway for the purpose of locating- the trouble that
its owner had while driving it. Although the mechanic was
exercising reasonable care in driving the car and making the test,
Jim Hupp: negligently drove his car into the. rear of the Hampton
automobile with the result that it was damaged in the amount of
$1200. Auto Repair Shop, Inc., immediately commenced an action
against Hupp to recover the full amount of the damage sustained
by the car. Hupp defended on the ground that Hampton alone could
- maintain an action to recover the damage to the car.
May Auto Repair Shop, Inc., recover in this action?

4. Parker wrote a letter to Arthur, with copy to Tate,
requesting him to act as his agent in purchasing for him a certain
unique and valuable painting owned by Tate. Parker enclosed
with his letter a proposed written contract of sale between Parker
and Tate, the purchase price and the terms of payment being left
blank. Parker signed the proposed c6ntract before enclosing it
with his letter. · The day after Arthur and Tate received the
letter from Parker, Arthur received a telegram from Parker telling
him not to purchase the painting and to return the contract to
him. At the time Parker sent the telegram he addressed and posted
a letter to Tate advising him that he had decided not to purchase
the painting and that he had cancelled Arthur's authority to
act for him.
Upon receipt of the telegram Arthur immediately
presented the written contract to Tate who signed it after the
amount of the purchase price and terms of payment had been filled
in.
By the terms of the contract Tate agreed to deliver

-3the painting to Park.er five days later. A few hours after Tate
signed the contract and delivered it to Arthur he received the letter
sent to him by Parker, terminating Arthur's authority to act for him
as his agent. Tate consults you, inquiring whether the contract is
binding upon Parker.
What would you advise?

5. Billings leased his large public garage building
in Buchanan, Virginia, to Henry Tucker. The written lease provided
that it was to continue for one year from the date thereof, at a
total rental of $1200, said rental to be paid in monthly installments
of $100 each. The lease granted to Tucker an option to purchase the
property for $40,000, provided the option was exercised on or before
the expiration date of the lease. The lease contained no provision
for renewal upon the expiration of the lease. Tucker continued to
occupy the property after the expiration of the term of the lease and
paid to Billings $100 each month for a period of four months, although there was no agreement between the parties extending or renewing the lease. At the end of four months Billings received an offer
from Rufus Gilbert to purchase the property for $45,000. Billings
gave a thirty-day written notice to Tucker to vaca_te the property.
Upon receipt of the notice, Tucker wrote a letter to Billings,
stating that he expected to occupy the premises for the remainder of
the year following the expiration date of the written lease, his
occupancy to be upon the same terms contained in the written lease.
Also, in his letter Tucker advised Billings that he exercised his
option to purchase the property for $40,000, and that on the day
before the expiration date of the new one year period, he would
tender the purchase money and demand a deed for the property.
Billings consults you and asks you to advise him:
1. Whether Tucker has the right to remain
in possession of the property for the
additional one year period upon the terms
contained in the written lease; and
2. Whether Tucker's letter was an effective
exercise of the option to purchase the property .

..

How would you advise him?

6. Robert Landacre took possession of a farm in
Goochland County, Virginia, that was devised to him by the will of
his uncle, Virgil Scott. Shortly after taking possession of the farm
Landacre sold and conveyed it to James Greenfield, Landacre' s wife,
Maud, joining in the deed. The deed contained this covenant:
11

And the said Robert Landacre and Maud, his·

-4wife, covenant that they have a good right
to sell and convey said property, and that
they warrant generally the title thereto . 11
Some months later James Greenfield sold and conveyed this farm to
Tom Hedgerow, but the deed contained no covenants or warranties.
It later developed that Virgil Scott did not own the farm, and that
Landacre did not acquire good title under Scott's will. Hedgerow
was dispossessed at the suit of the legal holder of title. Thereupon
Hedgerow commenced an action against Reobert Landacre and Maud
Landacre to recover damages for the breach of the covenants contained in their deed to Greenfield.
May Hedgerow recover from either or both of
them?

7. One evening James Dove and his wife Shirley,
intending to visit their friends Mr. and Mrs. Bates, mistakenly
went to the wrong residence and knocked on the front door. The
door was opened by Andy Gump, who was owner of the residence and
the operator of a neighborhood confectionary. When he saw James
Dove he became livid with anger and said, "You are the customer I
saw steal $10 from my cash register this afternoon and run from my
store before I could catch you.n Thereupon Gump seized Dove,
dragged him into the hallway, struck him across the face and fo~ced
him into the hallway closet, locking the door. He then called
through the door to Dove and said, 11 You are going to stay in that
closet until you either return my money or tell me where you have
hidden it.n With that Shirley Dove ran screaming from the house in
search of a policeman. Although Dove protested to Gump his
·
innocence, Gump refused to release him. After having been locked
in the closet approximately twenty minutes, Dove succeeded in
breaking open the door, running past Gump, and making his escape.
Dove now consults you and asks that you advise him of what cause or
causes of action he has against Gump.
Assuming Dove innocent of the charges made against
him by Gump, how should you advise him?

8. Andrew Grew was driving.his Volkswagen with his wife
as a passenger in the business section of the City of Richmond.
While driving at a high rate of speed, Grew turned to the left from
Main Street on to. Eighth Street and the vehicle overturned. Adam
Grew was rendered unconscious. Although Mrs. Grew was thrown out
of the Volkswagen, it fell heavily on the lower part of her body
and pinned her beneath it. Mrs. Grew at once began to scream from
the extreme pain she was suffering, and Thomas Keene rushed from
the sidewalk and with great effort raised the vehicle sufficiently
to permit Mrs. Grew to crawl free. Because of his efforts in aiding
Mrs. Grew, Keene suffered torn muscles in his back and was bedridden

-5for approximately six weeks.
Thereafter, Keene sued Adam Grew in the Law and
Equity Court of the City of Richmond for $6,ooo damages charging
Grew with negligence proximately causing Keene's injuries. In his
grounds of defense, Grew alleged Keene had assumed the risk and was
guilty of contributory negligence. During the trial, and while
Keene was on the witness stand, counse 1 for Grew asked him, 11 How
old are you? 11 Keene answered, 11 r am 68."
Grew's counsel then
asked, "Didn't you realize that you ran considerable risk of injury
to yourself in lifting that Volkswagen off of Mrs. Grew?" Keene
replied, 11 Yes. I knew that it was a dangerous thing for me to do,
but I felt I had to do something to help Mrs. Grew." Shortly
thereafter Keene rested his case, and counsel for Grew moved the
Court to strike Keene's evidence on the ground that the latter's
testimony showed him to have assumed the risk and to be guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
How should the Court rule?

9. While Alfred Romeo was 500 feet away from, and
driving in a westerly direction toward, a two lane bridge suspended
over the Dan River in Halifax County, he saw Thomas MacBeth standing
against the railing of the bridge and fishing from its right side.
At the same time, Romeo saw distantly approaching in the eastbound
lane an automobile being driven by Goeffry Hamlet. Romeo did not
slacken his speed and, to avoid Macbeth, on nearing him Romeo swung
his automobile into the eastbound lane of traffic. Before he could
return to the westbound lane, the left front portion of his automobile collided with the left front portion of that being driven
by Hamlet. As a result of the collision, Hamlet suffered severe
injuries. Shortly thereafter, Hamlet brought an action against
both Romeo and Macbeth in the Circuit Court of Halifax County
charging each with negligence contributing to his injuries. Neither
Romeo nor Macbeth charged Hamlet with contributory negligence.
During the trial, the foregoing facts were proven. After all
evidence was in, Hamlet offered several instructions to the Court,
one of which read as follows:
"The Court instructs the jury that an ordinance
of Halifax County makes it a misdemeanor for any
person to fish from a bridge over which there is
vehicular traffic. Accordingly, should you
believe from a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant Macbeth was fishing from the
bridge at the time of the accident involved
in this case, that in so doing he caused the
defendant Romeo to swerve his automobile into
the eastbound lane, and that this contributed
to the collision between the vehicle of the

-6defendant Romeo and that of the plaintiff
Hamlet, then you should find the defendant
Macbeth guilty of negligence and return
your verdict against him and for the
plaintiff Hamlet. 11
Counsel for Macbeth conceded that this instruction correctly recited the ordinance of Halifax County, but objected to the giving
of the instruction assigning grounds therefor.
·
Should this objection have been sustained?
10. In March of 1966, while Paul Taylor was visiting
at the home of Ray Davis, Taylor expressed his admiration of an
antique vase in Davis' living room. The next day Taylor wrote and
mailed to Davis the following letter:
11

March 17, 1966

"Dear Ray:
As you know, I very much admired the beautiful vase in
your living room~which the two of us discussed yesterday
evening. I offer to buy it from you, and we can later agree on
the price. I would appreciate your letting me know whether
you are willing to sell it.
1t

/s/ Paul Taylor"

On receiving this letter from Taylor, Davis wrote the following
reply:
1t

March 18, 1966

"Dear Paul:
I appreciate your letter of March 17th, and accept your
offer to buy my vase. I will send it to you tomorrow. The price
I am asking is $600, that being the qmount at which it was
appraised on the death of my mother from whom I inherited it.
ll/s/ Ray Davis 11
On receiving this letter from Davis, Taylor telephoned Davis and
stated that he did not want to purchase the vase because he thought
the price was exorbitant, and that, in any event, he would not be
able to accept delivery or pay for the vase for many months.
Sh~rtly thereafter Davis tendered the vase to Taylor and, on its
being refused, brought an action against Taylor in the Law and
Equity Court of the City of Richmond. In his motion for judgment

-7Davis alleged the foregoing facts, charged Taylor with breach of
contract, and asked damages of $200. As exhibits with his motion
for judgment, Davis filed true copies of the letters of March 17
and 18, 1966. Taylor filed a demurrer on the ground there was no
binding contract of sale between himself and Davis because (a) the
parties had not agreed on the purchase price, and (b) the parties
had not agreed on a time and place of delivery of the vase.
Should the demurrer be sustained on either,
or both, of these grounds?

